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The global environmental politics and political economy of seafood systems 
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Abstract 
This paper situates seafood in the larger intersection between global environmental governance 
and the food system. Drawing inspiration from the food regimes approach, we trace the historical 
unfolding of the seafood system and its management between the 1930s and the 2010s. In doing 
so we bridge global environmental politics research that has studied either the politics of fisheries 
management or seafood sustainability governance, and we bring seafood and the fisheries crisis 
into food regimes scholarship. Our findings reveal that the seafood system has remained firmly 
dependent upon the historical institutions of national seafood production systems, and particularly, 
the state-based regulatory regimes that they promulgated in support of national economic and 
geopolitical interests. As such, seafood systems contribute to a broader, historicized understanding 
of the hybrid global environmental governance of food systems in which non-state actors depend 
heavily upon, and in fact call for the strengthening of, state-based institutions. Our findings reveal 
that contemporary private ordering of seafood governance solidifies the centrality of state-based 
institutions in the struggle for ‘sustainable’ seafood and enables the continued expansionary, 
volume-driven extractivist logics that produced the fisheries crisis in the first place. 
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Since the early twentieth century, interactions between the environmental and food systems 
governance of ‘seafood’ produced by industrial fisheries – fishing activities undertaken by capital-
intensive vessels and gear types that involve a high level of technology and investment and that 
supply international markets –  have shaped and been shaped by socio-economic, technical and 
environmental change. Yet, the literature on fisheries systems in general, and in global 
environmental politics (GEP) specifically, is most commonly parsed analytically around either (1) 
the politics of fisheries management or (2) efforts to reform seafood value chains towards more 
‘sustainable’ practices.  
 
GEP scholars have developed a rich body of literature on international fisheries management. This 
work often begins with a now-familiar story about a fisheries crisis resulting from poor governance 
by states, exacerbated by weak property regimes in oceans and historical practices of state 
subsidies to support fish extraction (World Bank 2009, Barkin and DeSombre 2013). In this 
context, GEP scholars have explored and explained the vexing challenges of generating inter-state 
cooperation and institutions to manage fisheries resources that cross national boundaries (Young 
1998). Recent work has proposed a global fisheries organization that deploys private, transferable 
quotas to promote ecosystem sustainability (Barkin and DeSombre 2013), scaling up earlier 
proposals to fix ‘commons’ problems in fisheries through private property rights (Gordon 1954). 
Related work examines how inter-state power politics and fishing firms’ economic and technical 
innovations shape fisheries management (Havice and Campling 2010; Webster 2009, 2015).  
 
GEP scholars have also explored ‘sustainable seafood’ as a tool of market-led governance. This 
private ordering is part of a broader proliferation of non-state actors and market-based regulation 
in environmental governance (Cashore 2002, Dauvergne and Neville 2009). Research has focused 
on procedural dimensions of private ordering, such as how efforts to enhancing sustainability in 
seafood production strive for legitimacy, authority and credibility (Gulbrandsen 2010, Miller and 
Bush 2015). Related work has documented that large firms use buyer-power to shape fisheries 
production and management practices, while improving their environmental reputations 
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(Gulbrandsen 2010). ‘Sustainable seafood’ eco-labels or green procurement policies are now 
commonplace in major markets in the US and Northern Europe and in some cases are essential for 
market access (Foley and Havice 2016; Havice and Campling 2017). Debate remains over what 
ecological impacts (if any) these forms of private ordering deliver (Ponte 2012), nonetheless, eco-
labelleing processes have been shown to restructure power relationships and resource access 
dynamics among firms in seafood value chains (Foley 2012). 
 
Some have analyzed interactions between international fisheries management and seafood 
systems, and called for more research in a similar vein (Gulbrandsen 2010, Adolf, Bush et al. 2016, 
XXX). We take up this call to offer two contributions to the study of the global environmental 
politics of food. First, we bridge and contextualize the historical (and constantly evolving) 
interplay between varied forms of fisheries management and the globalization of seafood 
production. Second, we offer an entry point for bringing seafood into scholarship on food regimes 
and food systems more broadly. Inspired by the food regimes approach, we offer a rough 
periodization of the development, globalization, and governance of seafood systems, interweaving 
the ways these dynamics have driven and responded to conditions of ecological ‘crisis’ in fisheries.  
 
Food regimes scholars conduct historical analysis of the political geography of the global food 
system, and its components (Friedman and McMichael 1989). Conceptually, the approach situates 
the rise and decline of national agricultures in the history of capitalism, enlivening empirical 
analysis of the production and consumption of food, the politics of food relations, and the role of 
industrial food production in state building in the modern age (for a review, see: McMichael 2013). 
Three periods of distinctive food regimes – focusing on terrestrially based food production – have 
been identified. The British-Centered Regime (1870-1930s) combined colonial tropical imports to 
Europe with basic grains and livestock imports from settler colonies to provision the emerging 
European working class and sustain Britain as the ‘workshop of the world’. The US-Centered 
Regime (1950s-1970s) is typified by broad state support in the form of subsidies and price 
supported farm programs, which in turn generated surplus food distributed in the form of food aid. 
These dynamics enabled corporations to establish transnational links between national farm sectors 
and develop a new international division of labor in agriculture and food processing (Raynolds et 
al. 1993). The contours of a much-debated third food regime, coined a corporate, or corporate-
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environmental food regime (1980s- onward), demarcates an era governed by neoliberal advocacy 
of market rule in which ‘national’ food production systems mix with international conditions of 
production and power of multinational corporations that developed under the second regime. By 
necessity, the third regime addresses the environmental conditions of production and ecological 
crises; scholars explore firms’ selective efforts to stave off reputational and production risks 
associated with changing global ecological conditions (Burch and Lawrence 2009; Friedmann 
2005; McMichael 2009).  
 
Methodologically, food regime analysis turns attention to the state-market nexus as it develops in 
space and through time. It begins with the national economy and investigates subsequent 
reconfigurations of ‘national’ systems of food production, such as the consolidation of corporate 
agribusiness and big retail, and the significance of ecological crisis and related market volatility in 
the global environmental politics of food systems (Goodman and Watts 1997, Weis 2007, 
Bernstein 2015). In this way, it situates food as central to the making and evolution of global 
political orders, and importantly for our work, it is premised on forms of enclosure of land and 
resources, and the altered ecological relations that result (McMichael 2013). 
 
Inspired by insights and methods of food regimes analysis, in what follows, we explore how, like 
agrifood production, industrial seafood developed from models of national production.1 While our 
analysis is not comprehensive, we draw out how seafood regimes have a particular temporality 
and form shaped by, first, the unfolding of fisheries management and the state-property regime in 
the oceans2 and later, the concomitant conditions of human-driven ecological change and decline 
of fish stocks. In what follows, we conduct a three-part periodization of the interplay of 
international fisheries management and seafood production systems: (1) we historicize the rise of 
national seafood production systems from the early 1900s-1960s, (2) we briefly detail the 
parameters of the globalization of food systems from the 1970s-1990s and the attendant ‘fisheries 
crisis’ of this time as a segue to, (3) a focused review of two intersecting hybrid, public-private 
                                                          
1 There has been little attention to seafood in food regimes literature, important exceptions include (Constance and 
Bonanno 2000; Foley and Mather Forthcoming) 
2 Enclosure of the oceans is central to intersecting dynamics in seafood sectors. Because of space constraints, we 




seafood governance mechanisms that have emerged since the early 2000s. These three periods do 
not map neatly with the three agrifood regimes outlined above because of the different 
characteristics of industrial fisheries and their distinction from agrifood systems (though there are 
important intersections with aquaculture production, fertilizer and animal feed, which we 
unfortunately do not have the space to explore here).3 Our analysis links the global environmental 
politics of international fisheries management with the globalization of industrial seafood 
production, and we offer it as an invitation for more work in this vein. 
 
Early 1900s-1960s: National Seafood Production Systems and After-the-Fact Environmental 
Regulation  
  
This section examines the role of state power in the unfolding capitalist appropriation and 
enclosure of nature in the global ocean. It seeks to explain the industrialization and organization 
of marine fisheries into national seafood production systems driven by capitals and states in 
competition, and to demonstrate how the intensification of extraction in one place pushed 
extensification of extraction into other places. We use the term national seafood production 
systems as a proximate conceptualization of linkages, tensions and competitive contradictions 
between industrial fishing and processing by leading nations of the time. Our notion of national 
seafood production systems mirrors the food regime approach in that it captures a historical 
dynamic (and its contemporary legacies) of competing states seeking to provide systems of 
provision for cheap food to growing working classes, distant water fisheries acting as a form of 
‘soft’ geopolitical influence, and support for ‘home’ capitals-in-competition, including for export-
oriented industrialization. Seafood is distinct, however, in that food production is intimately 
entangled with the management of the resource.  
 
Japan and the US were the two dominant national seafood systems of this era. In the 1930s, Japan’s 
fishing industry accounted for about 45 percent of the world’s fishing capacity, the US fishing 
fleet was the second largest, but its catch volume was only 50% of Japan’s (Smil and Kobayashi 
                                                          
3 Aquaculture production, especially from the 1980s onward, has contributed significantly to the growth in volume 
of seafood produced and traded in international markets, as well as related downward price trends (FAO 2016) and 
its market dynamics intersect directly with those in wild-caught fisheries (Marks 2012). 
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2012). As we will show, the competitive interaction between these two fleets and their home states 
intimately shaped international fisheries management. These states used distant water fishing fleets 
to establish and extend spheres of maritime influence and to appropriate marine life for processing 
industries and for fish markets at home and abroad.4 We show here that despite the spatial 
dispersion of their territoriality, these ‘national’ seafood systems were connected by global fishing-
processing-market linkages and locked-in by inter-state political mechanisms such as geo-political 
reach, aid, investment, and trade and industrial policies. The lack of property rights in the oceans 
eased fleets’ expansion into new waters and enabled new commodity frontiers: boats and boat 
owners could extract fish throughout the oceans without paying rent or being subject to state 
regulations.  
 
At the turn of the twentieth century, Japan’s national seafood production system was expanding 
rapidly. It aimed to feed workers in the rapid process of proletarianization from the Meiji 
Restoration onwards and to earn foreign exchange with export-oriented fish processing. 
Competition for profit and government incentives launched in 1898 compelled this industry 
(Butcher 2004).  The national seafood system was an integral part of the expanding Japanese 
Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere in the Pacific Ocean; what Tsutsui (2013) calls, ‘the pelagic empire’.  
In the 1910s, the Japanese state first sponsored experimental fishing trips to the south of Japan and 
quickly sponsored fishing bases in colonial Southeast Asia, initially to supply burgeoning local 
markets created by mines, plantations and growing cities.5 In parallel, the South Pacific Mandate 
of the Treaty of Versailles gifted Japan colonies in Micronesia where it established several fishing 
bases by the 1930s (Doulman 1987). Japanese imperialism produced new commodity frontiers in 
Southeast Asia that were based in part on the appropriation of marine life. By the late 1930s, new 
technology enabled Japanese vessels to catch fish in Southeast Asian waters and land them in 
Japan and its colony Taiwan. At this time, Japanese fishing industry employed around 1.5 million 
people and was active in multiple oceanic regions including US coastal waters (Smil and 
Kobayashi 2012). 
 
                                                          
4 A similar dynamic was unfolding in parallel in Western Europe’s fisheries, (Campling 2012). 
5 E.g. migrant Chinese and Indian workers were in need of a stable supply of protein to feed their bodies laboring to 
extract tin for European factories, producing, among other things, cans for food (Butcher 2004; Ross 2014).  
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The 1950s saw rapid industrial fisheries development, sparked by military technology developed 
during the War and closely supported by states and their scientific establishments (Finley 2011). 
After World War Two, ever-larger boats began to utilize refrigeration and freezing systems – 
overcoming the limited organic durability of fish that had previously forced fishers to either keep 
fish in ice, limiting the amount of time spent at sea, or to preserve fish at sea such as through 
salting. With Japan’s distant water fishing fleet annihilated by the War and the MacArthur Line 
temporarily blocking its redeployment, the US tuna fleet began to pour into Japan’s former spheres 
of influence, conducting experimental fishing trips funded in part by the US government. The US 
used its overseas territories as a base: American Samoa and Puerto Rico were propped up with 
subsidies, government procurement contracts and import tariffs. In 1953 and 1963 seafood 
processing firms Van Camp and Starkist respectively established factories in American Samoa 
creating a steady and increasing demand for American-caught fish, which in turn, spurred the US 
fishing fleet to expand fishing effort in the Pacific. The US Fish and Wildlife Service developed 
the Pacific Ocean Fishery Investigation Initiative, which studied tuna schools and supported 
exploratory fishing missions near American Samoa in the 1950s (McEvoy 1986, Felando 1987). 
State policy cohered the US national seafood system: trade policies, legal measures and 
government procurement contracts required processing capital running canneries in the US 
mainland and overseas territories to buy fish caught by the US fleet (Campling and Havice 2007).  
 
Japan’s post-War national seafood system was also supported by the state but was initially 
geographically limited by the US occupying authority. The government began to redevelop a 
national fishing fleet to combat serious domestic food shortages and to restart export-orientated 
(re-)industrialisation (Barclay and Koh 2008; Bergin and Haward 1996). When the Japan-US 
Peace Treaty relaxed the MacArthur Line in 1952, Japan’s fleet was rapidly rebuilt and steamed 
into offshore and distant waters. By 1954 Japan was again active in a considerable swath of its 
former fishing grounds in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Formal and informal regulatory 
mechanisms – such as a longstanding ‘understanding’ between the Japanese government and the 
distant water fleet owners that catch is landed directly in Japan6 – meant that domestic processors 
depended on supply from returning Japanese distant water fishing vessels. 
                                                          
6 In the mid-2000s some larger boats were permitted to export raw material to counter mounting costs (Interviews 




Japan supported its export-oriented industrialisation strategy with fish caught in and near other 
countries’ shores and by supplying not only the Japanese market, but exporting catch and 
processed seafood to US firms and markets. Resulting contestation between Japanese and US 
interests in salmon and tuna seafood systems illustrates the international dimensions of the 
national seafood system and proved formative in its subsequent management. Salmon and tuna, 
two large and valuable fisheries, are exemplary of the international contestation between these two 
leading national seafood systems. American capital set up a sizeable salmon processing industry 
in the US through the 1800s, building canning plants at the mouths of great rivers along the Pacific 
coast of North America to process salmon caught on their return from the ocean to spawn (White 
1995). Their bodies fed the canneries which in turn provided nutrition to the growing American 
working class and were exported to Britain to feed workers there too. In the 1930s Japanese fishing 
vessels began to position offshore in the open access ocean to catch the salmon before they could 
return into US territory to spawn, threatening the US industry’s raw material. The Japanese fishing 
fleet and US fishing and processing capital were engaged in direct competition for fish in 
geographic proximity to the US coast.  
 
In the case of tuna fisheries, that animals’ highly migratory nature shaped the engagement of the 
US and Japanese seafood systems. Tuna swim great distances, traversing the seas and the human-
drawn borders in them. The US tuna industry traces to early 1900s San Diego when vessels began 
catching fish relatively close to the US coast. However, by the 1930s, American tuna boats based 
in San Diego were catching as far as the Galápagos Islands (Soltesz 1991), taking advantage of 
open access conditions to fish across large geographic ranges without paying fees or undergoing 
licensing procedures.7 Following the War when the ocean-going US fishing fleet was decimated, 
the US government set up subsidies programs and state-sponsored science oriented to an 
expansive, extractivist logic that could also support post-war growing labor costs and related 
industry demand for highly-profitable convenience foods. The rebuilt tuna fishing industry sought 
new fishing grounds and began to intersect with the Japanese system as fishing grounds and 
markets began to overlap. For example, from the early 1950s Japan was exporting frozen tuna to 
                                                          
7 The shift from icing fish to using frozen brine was a major turning point in extending the commodity frontier as 
boats could stay at sea for longer, keeping their catch is relative stasis.  
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canneries in California, and by the 1960s Japanese seafood capital was exporting canned tuna 
processed in Japan to the US and Western Europe  (Ashenden and Kitson 1987). 
  
These intersections presented the post-War US state with a paradox. How could it stop rapidly 
reindustrializing Japanese fishing capital from fishing for salmon off the US West coast while 
simultaneously supporting the expansion of US fishing fleets into the Pacific Ocean to develop its 
own ‘pelagic empire’? International fisheries are rarely about fish alone. Instead, US support for 
the national seafood system was motivated by the combination of seafood commodity production 
– as the US Secretary of the Interior stated in 1947: ‘“Tuna is a magic word in any community or 
country which looks to the sea for food and profits”’ (cited by Felando 1987: 96) –  and geo-
political influence. At the time, the US government had its gaze on Latin America’s Pacific coast 
and the Central Pacific Ocean where tuna populations live, and in the latter, where the US Navy 
was planning post-War bases.  
 
The US state’s strategy to simultaneously establish a national right over ‘its’ salmon populations 
and support the expansion of its tuna industry into the open oceans and nearing other countries’ 
coasts fundamentally structured the contemporary global seafood system. In 1945, President 
Truman famously and unilaterally proclaimed US sovereignty over the continental shelf to secure 
control over access to oil and other mineral resources in the seabed and subsoil.8 Less well known, 
is that a second unilateral proclamation established the United States’ right to establish fishery 
‘conservation zones’ in the seas contiguous to the US coasts. The latter specified that the US would 
exclusively manage American fisheries in this zone in the interests of ‘conservation’. 9 As coastal 
and island states around the world were beginning to assert sovereignty over their exclusive 
economic zones and the principle was being debated at the ongoing UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea, the US further elaborated the parameters of the fishery conservation zone to address its 
interests in highly migratory tuna (in the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act 1976). To protect US distant water tuna fishing activities, the Magnuson Act 
stated that no coastal state had jurisdiction over highly migratory species because no single state 
could effectively manage a transboundary resource (U.S. Code, vol 16, sec 1813). The US utilized 
                                                          
8 Proclamation 2667 of September 28, 1946. 
9 Proclamation 2668 of September 28, 1946. 
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its own adherence to its national legislation to argue that its fleet could freely move through the 
Pacific in search of tuna. It argued that coastal and island states did not have sole sovereignty over 
highly migratory tuna stocks and thus could not exclude US fleets from fishing, require them to 
follow regulations, or pay access fees (Havice forthcoming; Kronmiller 1983).  
 
The Truman Declaration signaled a new dimension of the national seafood production system that 
differentiates seafood from other food regimes: resource management, which required developing 
methods for ‘managing’ fisheries resources. The US proposed and promoted ‘maximum 
sustainable yield’ (MSY) – defined as the maximum extraction of food from the sea on a sustained 
basis year after year – as the cornerstone of fisheries management. Post-war American fisheries 
policy, built on the MSY principle, saw humans as playing a positive role in increasing the 
efficiency and productivity of fish populations, which without human intervention would have 
‘wasted’ surplus production. The MSY approach posited that fishing could be sustained at 
specified levels into perpetuity. MSY became a part of American foreign and domestic policy in 
1949 when the State Department formally adopted it as the goal of American fisheries policy. Its 
principles had already been adopted in international contexts: the 1946 International Whaling 
Commission Convention promised that scientific management and increased whale harvest would 
result in an increase in the number of whales; MSY also guided US management of Japanese 
fisheries under American Occupation (Finley 2011). Into the 1950s, American diplomats pushed 
for MSY and it became the ‘scientific’ basis for many fisheries agreements signed in the formative 
period of international fisheries management. It was formally recognized as a legal concept during 
the Law of the Sea negotiations in 1958. 
 
In practice, MSY was a tool to avoid restrictions on fishing unless there was scientific proof that 
stocks were overfished – proofs that were then (as now) hard to ascertain, not least because of the 
difficulty of counting fish in the sea or in fishing vessel reports. It thereby provided a basis for the 
US fleet to expand into waters across the Pacific, despite objections from coastal states around 
‘ownership’ of the fish. MSY simultaneously enabled the US to exclude foreign fleets from 
catching ‘American’ salmon on the basis of conservation: by then, data on stock decline had been 
collected on this fishery. Archival evidence demonstrates that MSY was established as a quasi-
scientific ex post facto justification ‘with limited theoretical basis, and no experimental or 
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observational backing’ (Finley 2011, 93). Yet it remains a foundation of fisheries management, 
despite early and mounting critique (Larkin 1977) and the empirical failures (Bavington 2010). In 
short, the US restricted fishing on ‘its’ salmon, but made ownership of tuna ‘no-ones’ property’ 
(at least until it was extracted by fishing capital). The US coupled the fishery conservation zone 
and MSY as contradictory mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion that shaped conditions of access 
and propped up the US national seafood system. It is worth noting that as the US was establishing 
these regimes to protect its fleets’ access to raw materials, it was promoting liberalization of the 
trade in goods through the G.A.T.T. and liberalization of global agrifood systems. The legacy of 
these processes shaped the globalization of national seafood systems, to which we now turn.  
 
The Globalization of Seafood and the ‘Marine Fisheries Crisis’ 
The fisheries systems outlined above were never truly ‘national’; their territoriality often bled into 
dependence on catching fish in distant waters and selling finished commodities on international 
markets. From the 1970s and especially into the 1980s, national seafood production systems 
became increasingly globalized, mirroring trends in global agrifood systems; despite the 
simultaneous countervailing tendency of growing state enclosure of the oceans with the creation 
of 200-mile EEZs and the resources within them. As a brief segue linking the prior section with 
the following, here we identify some of these dimensions.  
 
International fisheries management of highly migratory species is an important dimension of the 
globalization era. It required inter-state coordination (if not cooperation) on the governance of 
resource extraction for many commercially important species both ‘in-zone’ and in the high seas 
(no-ones’ property). Ultimately mandated for highly migratory species by the 1982 UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, international fisheries management bodies became sites in 
which multiple states negotiate and express power over resource extraction practices, often in the 
interest of ‘national’ fleets and (Havice and Campling 2010; Webster 2009). At the same time, 
distinctly ‘national’ seafood production systems began destabilizing in the context of a wave of 
corporate mergers and acquisitions among branded food manufacturers and big grocery retail, and 
the industrialization of parts of East and Southeast Asia in the emerging new international division 




In seafood processing, specialized non-branded processors emerged to supply the growing buying 
power of big retail and branded capital in Western Europe and North America: some of these (e.g. 
Philippines and Indonesia) depended on fish supply from their waters, others (e.g. Thailand) 
secured supply from around the world. Simultaneously, fishing capacity grew rapidly in ways that 
reflected the changing national seafood system. In the 1970s Japanese trading companies (sōgō 
shōsha) financed the development of South Korean and Taiwanese fishing companies (which also 
received substantial public supports from their own ‘home’ state) and formed affiliated companies 
with interlocking business relationships that locked the new industrial distant water fleets into 
fixed supply contracts. These arrangements secured Japanese clients (and financiers) diversified 
fish supply (Comitini 1987; Haward and Bergin 2001). This practice provided the finance and 
marketing networks that made South Korea and Taiwan among the leading industrial fishing fleets 
in the world, and ultimately, direct competitors with American and Japanese fishing capital, 
especially in the Pacific Ocean. Lacking domestic consumer markets and export-oriented fish 
processing, the new industrial fleets provided raw material to emerging non-branded processors in 
Southeast Asia. Emerging processors proved intense competition for American, Japanese and 
European branded processors in their own markets, thereby fragmenting ‘national’ seafood 
systems in favor of a world market for raw material among competing processors, and cheapening 
fish product prices.10 The dynamics of appropriation were now reconfigured with a larger number 
of boats competing to supply a greater diversity of processors, driving greater volumes of resource 
extraction, and undermining the cost competitiveness of processors in several countries in the 
global North.  
 
By the 1980s, foreign competition and cross-penetration of capital substantially eroded, or at least 
muddied the (intersecting) national seafood production systems of the 1950s and 1960s. 
Significant aspects of the ‘national’ nonetheless remained, for example domestic capital often 
owned national fleets that were bound by national regulatory practices (e.g. the ‘US fleet’, the 
‘Spanish fleet’). Simultaneously however, during the 1970s and 1980s, the practice of ‘flags of 
convenience’ proliferated. Under this strategy, global capital (vessel owners) register vessels in a 
country with open registries and light regulatory oversight so as to reduce labor regulation, 
                                                          
10 For example, imports of canned lightmeat tuna in the USA dropped sharply in price from US$30.38 per case in 
1981 to US$19.06 in 1985 (Iverson 1987). 
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maximize post-tax profits and, crucially, to avoid national management constraints on fishing 
capacity (DeSombre 2006; Campling and Colas 2017). National tendencies and globalizing 
counter tendencies continued to co-exist in the processing sector – fragmenting simple 
periodization such as between the ‘national’ and the ‘global’. For example, in 1982 there were 12 
tuna canneries on the US mainland; by 1986 there was one. Meanwhile, processing proliferated in 
lower cost production sites around the world (Floyd 1987). However, to the present day, Spain 
uses high import tariffs and state subsidies to protect its large fish processing industry (still 
primarily owned by private Spanish capital) from the international competition that plagued the 
‘US’ canneries (Campling 2016).  
 
As seafood production globalized, global fish catch expanded dramatically from roughly 40 
million metrics tons in the early 1960s to nearly 90 million metrics tons by the early 1990s; it has 
remained largely stagnant since (FAO 2016). The global intensification and extensification of 
seafood extraction coincided with the globalization of the broader food system forged through 
parallel and sometimes intersecting processes. These included: scientific developments in 
production (shipping practices and supply chain management); official development assistance for 
fishing-related equipment and infrastructure expansion; and, enhanced competition and 
consolidation in transnational agrifood and retail (Friedman and McMichael 1989,  Goodman and 
Watts 1997, Clapp and Fuchs 2009).  Previously national cuisine such as sushi and sashimi became 
global cultural phenomenon (Bestor 2000). 
 
By the early 2000s, the globalization of fisheries extraction and of seafood trade and consumption 
was driving dramatic ecological change and resource decline in a wide range of fisheries and ocean 
ecosystems. Awareness of a ‘fisheries crisis’ emerged in powerful ways.  In 1992, the North 
Atlantic cod fishery – among the most prolific fisheries in history – collapsed and the Canadian 
government closed the fishery, a stunning outcome for a fishery recognized worldwide as governed 
by the most advanced and well-funded science-based fisheries management (Bavington 2010). By 
the early 2000s, the FAO was reporting that 75 percent of all fisheries globally where either fully 
exploited or overexploited (FAO 2002). Subsequent scientific studies linked ever-expanding 
fishing capacity and efficiency to declines in fisheries biomass across all ocean basins (e.g. Myers 
and Worm 2003). They scientifically documented declining fish populations and identified 
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uncontrolled industrial fishing as the culprit, bringing the ‘fisheries crisis’ into the popular 
imagination and political debate.  
 
The fisheries crisis, combined with the contours of globalized seafood production, laid the basis 
for renewed attention and innovation in ‘fisheries governance’, including: ‘good governance’ in 
fisheries management (World Bank 2004), use of trade tools to promote economic efficiency in 
fisheries (Campling and Havice 2013), and growing attention to fisheries sustainability by 
international environmental NGOs (Gruby and Campbell 2013). It also generated new marketing 
and production configurations relying on non-state tools such as third party eco-certification and 
supply chain management practices (Jacquet and Pauly 2007). In the following section, we offer a 
focused review of two intersecting hybrid, public-private seafood governance mechanisms that 
have emerged since the early 2000s, exploring how they are shaped by and shape globalized 
seafood production and the historical legacy of the national seafood production systems.11  
 
2000s onward: A corporate-environmental seafood governance regime?  
A much debated question in food regimes analysis is the extent to which the second, ‘globalized’ 
food regime has transitioned into a ‘corporate’ food regime governed by neoliberal advocacy of 
market rule. In this context, multinational corporations are seen to stabilize and enhance their own 
accumulation by organizing agri-food supply chains through a range of privately regulated food-
quality standards (Friedmann 2005, 254). This process includes playing to differential buyer and 
consumer expectations for production, and selectively appropriating environmental objectives and 
demands of environmental movements (McMichael 2013; Cutler 2001). With growing influence 
and power, multinational corporations have been conceptualized as offering a substitute for public 
authority denuded of power to regulate a global economy, or at least redefined to facilitate 
neoliberal restructuring in the global food system. 
 
Rather than a binary of (inter)national regulation or private ordering, global governance 
scholarship broadly (Sending and Neumann 2006; The IGLP Law and Global Production Working 
Group 2016) and in resource sectors including industrial fisheries specifically (Foley 2013; Lister 
                                                          
11 Our argument has some parallels with González-Esteban’s (2018) analysis of the path dependence of international 
wheat markets – a central pillar of the second food regime – well into the twenty-first century.  
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2012) has shown that public and private regulation are intertwined and co-constitutive in the 
ordering of food systems. To reflect on the nature of these relations, we review the public-private 
interactions associated with two related exertions of private power in international fisheries 
governance formulated around sustainability claims: the Marine Stewardship Council and the 
International Seafood Sustainability Foundation. We focus on how these mechanisms have gained 
power in segments of the globalized seafood system by entangling non-state sustainability claims 
with the legacies of the national seafood systems’ fisheries management regimes. We note that our 
review is selective in nature and while discourses and firm commitments to produce and procure 
‘sustainable seafood’ have proliferated in segments of North American and European markets, 
they are not ubiquitous and are not central to seafood systems outside of these markets, including 
the growing dominance of the Chinese fleet, processing and consumer markets.  
 
In 1996, Unilever and the World Wildlife Fund for nature (WWF) announced a joint venture called 
the Marine Stewardship Council, a standard setting and eco-labeling not-for-profit entity. The 
founders of the scheme were the world’s largest buyer of frozen fish and non-profit conservation 
organization, each emblematic of growing global power, transnationality and interpenetration of 
capital in food systems and globally networked environmental movements seeking to correct the 
resulting ecological problems. WWF’s interest in fostering sustainability in global fish stocks is 
consistent with its conservation mission. For Unilver, the collapse of the Grand Banks cod fishery 
of Newfoundland in the early 1990s demonstrated how a fishery closure resulting from 
overexploitation could cut off cheap, plentiful and secure supplies of seafood, threatening profits 
and long-term financial returns to investors (Foley 2013). To justify the novel project, they cited 
that state-led fisheries management bodies were complicit in the emergence of the fisheries crisis. 
 
Initial assessments described the MSC as not only a response to state failure, but also an 
organization that ‘…privatizes the eco-labeling process within a supranational NGO structure 
centered on scientific criteria for fisheries management and market based incentives. Through a 
process of de facto de-regulation of nation-State’s laws, treaties, and policies regarding fisheries 
issues, the MSC re-regulates the coordination of the global fisheries away from public venues and 
into private arenas’ (Constance and Bonanno 2000, 135). By this rationale, the MSC was seen as 
‘a new blend of free-market, science-based, environmentalism’ aimed at resolving difficult 
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fisheries management issues (ibid). Under this new private ordering, global NGOs would provide 
the organizational oversight and scientific verification that links sustainable production 
(undertaken by firms in global value chains) to world consumption, coupling these in a system of 
global socio-technical rationalization. This MSC case is consistent with depictions of a ‘corporate-
environmental’ food regime reconfigured by a politics of neoliberalization and market-
environmentalism dominated by corporate agribusiness capital, and governed by collaborations 
between capital and once oppositional environmental movements and associated ideologies of 
market rule (Friedman 2005).  
 
However, more recent analysis, having the luxury of analyzing more than a decade of MSC 
certification processes, details the imbrication of state-led structures of fisheries management and 
private governance initiatives (Gulbrandsen 2014). Science, and the deployment of competing 
scientific narratives about ‘sustainability’ and the path to achieving it, is a central mechanism of 
this imbrication. From the beginning, the MSC’s Environmental Standard for Sustainable Fishing 
– a product of debate among fisheries scientists, academics, industry representatives and 
government stakeholders – has had three main assessment principles of sustainability: the health 
of the fish stock, the impacts of the fishery on marine ecosystems and the efficacy of the existing 
fisheries management system (current guidelines in MSC 2015). Since governments are generally 
responsible for managing fisheries resources and producing scientific information on the health of 
stocks and effects of fishing, assessing fisheries for MSC certification requires assessment of 
government and inter-state management rules, institutions and data (Foley 2013). After an 
uncertain start, from 2006 on, the MSC certification grew rapidly spurred by retailer commitments 
to procure MSC-certified seafood products. In 2017, the MSC certified 12 percent of global marine 
wild catch, twice the figure of 2010 (MSC 2017). Commentators have described the organization 
as holding a virtual monopoly in establishing widely adopted standards for responsible fisheries 
management (Ponte 2012). The expansion of this purportedly market-based system relies heavily 
on state-based management structures to enable firms to make and demonstrate commitments to 
sustainable seafood. 
 
Growing acceptance of MSC certification has not been in the interest of all private sector actors. 
While retailers might have made gains in reputation in their supply chains, suppliers have 
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documented and protested high costs of certification and implementation, disruptions to their 
market access, and the inaccessibility of the standard, with many seeking alternative mechanisms 
for demonstrating the sustainability attributes of their products (Christian, Ainley et al. 2013, Foley 
and Havice 2016). The International Seafood Sustainability Foundation (ISSF) is one such variant 
of private ordering that emerged in part to protect industry from the impacts of the MSC.12 In 2009 
tuna branded processors developed ISSF in partnership with prominent scientists and with one of 
MSC’s founders – WWF. International fisheries that contribute to the production of canned tuna 
products are among the largest and most valuable in the world. Additionally, these fisheries’ major 
markets include the US and Western Europe where retailers, under pressure from large eNGOs, 
are seeking mechanisms to demonstrate their commitment to sustainability. In the US in particular 
and in some Western European markets, canned tuna is a low price product and consumers are 
reluctant to pay higher prices, including for products carrying sustainability assurances. As a result, 
processing and fishing firms have been reluctant to commit to eco-labels in part out of concern 
that they would absorb production and some reputational costs of certification processes (see 
Havice and Campling 2017 for a more complete discussion).  
 
A charitable organization, ISSF’s stated mission is to undertake ‘science-based initiatives for the 
long-term conservation and sustainable use of tuna stocks, reducing bycatch and promoting 
ecosystem health’ (ISSF 2014). By mid-2015, the commercial members of the ISSF were 19 
branded and non-branded manufacturers representing roughly 75 percent of the total global tuna 
processing capacity.13 ISSF members could use their collective buying power to directly influence 
sustainability practices in seafood value chain and have made member commitments for direct 
action on sustainability, including, for example, agreeing to prohibit transactions with vessels 
known to carry out shark-finning or with vessels that do not comply with fisheries management 
regulations. In addition to these direct actions, ISSF generates scientific analyses that it uses to 
influence existing environmental governance practices. These efforts have focused especially on 
criticizing state-led fisheries management as well as non-state governance, including the MSC 
                                                          
12 According to an international fisheries expert with experience in ISSF, ISSF was initially formed directly to 
counter the threat of MSC certification to private sector interests in the canned tuna sector, though it has since 
broadened its scope of work and influence significantly, as evidenced by its large body of work and activities. 
Personal Communication, Feb 8, 2017. 
13 E-mail communication, ISSF, July 2015. 
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(ISSF 2013). In engagements with the MSC certification of tuna fisheries, ISSF has developed a 
strategy for doing both at once. 
 
In 2011, following the usual assessment process, the MSC approved two tuna fisheries for 
certification: the high volume, large-scale Western and Central Pacific free-school skipjack purse 
seine fisheries and the New Zealand albacore troll fishery, a much smaller but commercially 
relevant fishery. In response, ISSF lodged formal objections at the MSC to both certifications on 
grounds that the state-led regional fisheries management organization regulations overseeing the 
fisheries were not robust enough to meet requirements for the eco-certification (Jackson 2011). 
ISSF’s claim was based on its internally produced ‘Status of the World Fisheries for Tuna’ (ISSF 
Scientific Advisory Committee 2009). ISSF used its MSC objections to focus management efforts 
and attention on the inter-state system, arguing that it – rather than private certification schemes – 
is the only regulatory structure with the power and scope to generate lasting fisheries sustainability.  
 
More recently, ISSF drew on its scientific expertise to conduct and release a study analyzing the 
sustainability of global tuna stocks against Marine Stewardship Council criteria (Powers and 
Medley 2016). The analysis involved scoring stocks in each regional fisheries management 
organization using MSC criteria (ISSF 2017). ISSF conducts and updated the study for two 
reasons: first, as a resource for future tuna certifications and/or fisheries improvement projects 
(FIPs) that many retailers rely upon for sustainable procurement policies and second, as a tool to 
review the strengths and weaknesses of tuna regional fisheries management organizations.  
 
The study evaluated 19 tuna stocks against two of the three MSC criteria: fish stock health and 
efficacy of the existing fisheries management system. It used MSC’s own performance indicators 
and guidelines for scoring fisheries. The analysis suggested variable health across stocks and some 
improvement in regional fisheries management organizations’ performance. However, it 
emphasized a particular finding: only six of 19 major commercial tuna stocks would receive a 
passing score on MSC’s criteria. The report thus preemptively deemed the remaining 13 stocks 
ineligible for MSC certification, in many cases because of the lack of well-defined harvest control 
rules in place at regional fisheries management organizations. The study killed two birds with one 
science-based ISSF stone: countering the costly threat of MSC certification and reiterating its 
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claim that state-led fisheries management is the appropriate management tool for improving 
sustainability. 
 
ISSF is a group of leading firms that – usually engaged in intense competition with each other – 
have collectivity created a novel form of private ordering designed to influence environmental 
governance. It has enabled ISSF members to delay and weigh in on the MSC process that, initiated 
by retailer demand, would be costly for processing firms (ISSF members) to implement (Freitas 
2010). It also enabled ISSF members to divert attention from its members’ own high-volume raw 
material demand and towards inter-state management shortcomings. Notably, inter-state 
management measures are slow to emerge, and when they do, they apply evenly to all ISSF 
members and their suppliers. In sum, ISSF uses the combination of private ordering and scientific 
expertise to simultaneously delegitimize MSC and blame the fisheries crisis on the failings of 
state-led management. As noted above, it is well-established that private ordering works through 
interactions with the state and state-based management.  
 
Despite being (necessarily) partial, our analysis makes two contributions to understanding the 
global environmental politics of contemporary seafood systems. First, we situate the rise of private 
power in fisheries governance in the broader narrative of the seafood regime, demonstrating that 
it emerges not only through buyer power and market-based incentives for sustainable seafood, but 
through firms’ direct engagement with the historical trajectory of national seafood systems and 
their state-led governance. The MSC and ISSF fundamentally rely on the long trajectory of the 
national seafood system, particularly the fisheries management bodies that it yielded, for their own 
reproduction. This point corroborates, and deepens, understanding of the delicate balancing of 
distance and proximity that non-state actors play in relation to the state, that has been elaborated 
elsewhere (Hallström and Boström 2010). Second, we reveal that, as in the era of the MSY-driven 
national seafood system, in the apparent contemporary shift to non-state, or market-based seafood 
governance, non-state actors develop and deploy scientific knowledge and narratives in order to 
legitimize the ongoing expansionary logics of seafood production systems. The MSC seeks to 
enroll an ever greater volume of seafood production in its certification scheme, while ISSF’s tactics 
are inseparable from the simultaneous dynamics of high volume and low prices coupled with the 
growing imperative to demonstrate ‘sustainability’ criteria which are now central to contemporary 
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seafood production systems.  In short, the so-called contemporary corporate-environmental food 
regime is structured around direct engagement with existing state-led management systems that 
offer the foundation for extraction. Yet, this private ordering of the seafood system remains 
strategically silent on the voracious appetite for profit as the primary force structuring the 
globalized seafood system.  
 
Conclusions 
On the whole, global environmental politics research on international fisheries has studied either 
the politics of fisheries management or seafood sustainability governance. Inspired by food 
regimes literature, our account of the historical unfolding of the globalized seafood production 
system from its foundations in nation-state based governance systems offers a bridge between 
these two research areas. It also brings seafood into food regimes and broader food studies 
scholarship and, in doing so, highlights dynamics of continuity and change in the politics of 
environmental governance in food regimes. 
Our findings corroborate core dimensions of the food regimes literature. For one, the ‘national 
seafood system’ was the product of an international system in which states promoted perceived 
national interests by working through and with a range of international processes (see Bernstein 
2015) ranging from domestic industry supports, trade protection and integrating particular 
scientific models into fisheries management – all of which complement expansionary fisheries 
aims. The geographical expansion and interactions of distinct national seafood systems required a 
novel state-centric regime of environmental regulation that took the form of ‘international fisheries 
management’. By the 1990s, as the contradictions of this ‘national’ project unfolded in the failure 
of state-centric regulation of fish stocks and the globalization of seafood production systems, non-
state actors advanced environmental governance (private ordering) such as eco-labelling and 
voluntary industry sustainability initiatives, using the globalized food system to govern the 
environment. The corporate-environmental food regime does not present a moment of privatized 
governance in seafood systems. It is firmly embedded in, and dependent upon, the historical 
institutions of national seafood production systems, and particularly, the state-based regulatory 
regimes that it promulgated in support of national economic and geopolitical interests. As such, 
seafood systems offer a complex story in which non-state actors depend heavily upon, and in fact 
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call for the strengthening of, those state-based institutions. This process has had the surprising 
outcome of developing a private ordering that solidifies the centrality of state-based institutions in 
struggles over sustainable fisheries management and sustainably branded seafood (though these 
may not be one and the same).  
Most striking is that the volume of extraction remains the core commonality across each of the 
seafood regimes, and one that is directly or indirectly sustained through state-led governance, 
private ordering, and their interactions. National seafood systems promoted volume to ensure the 
reproduction of domestic capital, sustain new industrial societies by providing cheap food for 
workers and their families, and extended geopolitical influence. Volume also is the basis for the 
growth imperative central to multinational, private interest groups leading the purported non-state 
governance of the contemporary era. Our analysis suggests that the volume of extraction – the 
ultimate harbinger of the fisheries crisis – has and continues to underwrite the logic of the evolving 
of the seafood system. 
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